CETRI
For many Indonesians, the violent riots currently wracking Jakarta and other cities across the archipelago are eerily reminiscent of the riots of 1998 that accompanied the fall of former dictator Soeharto and his New Order regime after three decades in power.
As in 1998, demonstrators have targeted the legislative complex and “fat cat” politicians they see as neglecting and even impoverishing them. Rioters are also vandalising the homes of politicians and stripping them of luxury goods.
Also striking is the behaviour of the security forces. While there are widespread reports of violence by police, some members of the military are said to have been standing by and not stopping the looting. In one case, they even handed out drinks and cash to rioters.
Again, this reminds many of the involvement of the military in the 1998 riots, when soldiers harshly cracked down on protesters, but were also accused of facilitating rioting and looting. Current President Prabowo Subianto, then a senior army general, was dismissed after being allegedly implicated in these events, particularly in the forced disappearances of democracy activists.
The situation in Jakarta is not yet as serious as it was in 1998, but the presence of thousands of violent rioters targeting the rich and powerful is still a nightmare for Indonesia’s oligarchic elite. Mass protests are one of the few things that give them pause – and sometimes even force them to back down.
This is why those protests can also be vulnerable to manipulation by members of that same elite : they hope to weaponise public fury against each other.
But there is much more to these events than just elite rivalry.
Political perks and public pain
In recent years, huge protests calling on legislators to abandon plans to pass a repressive new criminal code or gut the once-respected Anti-Corruption Commission have failed. But this has only added to a backlog of grievances against politicians. On Independence Day on August 17, some protesters even flew pirate flags below the national flag. Officials called this act “treason”.
The current street protests began spontaneously a week later on August 25, with people calling for the dissolution of the national legislature (known by the acronym DPR). Protesters were enraged that legislators had granted themselves lavish new monthly housing allowances of approximately A$4,700, which the deputy speaker claimed was still not enough, even though many politicians already earn more than $9,000 per month (and some more than $21,000), tax free.
The angry public response was understandable, given the minimum wage in Jakarta is just $500 per month. There is deep resentment in Indonesia of politicians, who are seen as corrupt, lazy and out of touch.
The growing budget hole created by Prabowo’s costly signature projects means many basic social services have been slashed since he was sworn in last October, including health, education and local government funding. The ranks of the poor are growing and the middle class is shrinking. Both segments of society are hurting.
Unsurprisingly, the demonstrators demanded the legislators’ new housing allowances be cancelled, along with other perks such as overseas junkets. Lawmakers responded arrogantly, with one even calling the protesters “the dumbest people in the world”.
The demonstrations were relatively calm at first. Then, on August 28, a 21-year-old motorcycle taxi driver, Affan Kurniawan, who happened to be making a delivery near the protests, was run over and killed by a police vehicle.
The symbolism could hardly be starker. A precarious gig economy worker struggling to support his parents on a pittance crushed by an armoured vehicle driven by the police, popularly seen as corrupt and oppressive agents of the political elite. It seemed to encapsulate the issue at the heart of the demonstrations – elite greed and lack of concern for the “little people”.
Motorbike taxi associations and many other community groups quickly organised, demanding police be held accountable. The protests then grew outside Jakarta police headquarters and spread rapidly across Indonesia. Rioters targeted police stations, government buildings, and bus and train stations.
Looting and even arson attacks followed, resulting in numerous regional legislatures being destroyed. There have been at least seven deaths so far.
Prabowo now says he is listening to protesters’ grievances and the DPR will cancel the legislator allowances. It remains to be seen if that ever happens and whether it will last, given it’s in Prabowo’s interests to keep lawmakers’ pockets full.
Reflecting his military past and “strongman” self-image, the president has also said the protesters are committing treason and terrorism. He has called on police to act against them with “determination”.
Conspiracy theories running wild
These events are clearly a threat to some members of the elite, but there is no doubt they offer opportunities to others.
Some protesters believe the different responses of the police and the army – longstanding rivals for status, funds and influence – reflect their competing political allegiances.
Prabowo, a former Special Forces commander, is said to be backed by the army, while the police chief, Listyo Sigit Prabowo (no relation), is loyal to former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, who appointed him. Jokowi also presided over huge growth in police budgets and numbers while in office.
While Prabowo won last year’s presidential election thanks to an alliance he formed with Jokowi, the two now seem locked in a struggle for power.
Some critics suggest it would suit Prabowo for the police to be the villains in the current protests, as that would weaken Jokowi. Army inaction (or even provocation or support for the rioting) helps achieve that. The ultimate aim, they suggest, might even be to disband the national police and make it a subordinate branch of the military, as it was under Soeharto.
In 1998, Prabowo was allegedly involved in manipulating the rioting in Jakarta in a failed effort to win power. Many Indonesians believe a similar high-stakes scheme today is not beyond him.
Whether or not this is true, conspiracy theories are running wild. It’s certainly possible the elite would try to meddle in events in the streets, even if details are likely to remain murky.
But it’s equally apparent the protests are a genuine outburst of long-simmering grievances against the political elite, guided by grassroots civil society organisations. Unfortunately, these groups have not yet been able to articulate the clear set of political demands that could create a more unified movement out of the street protests, as happened in 1998.
How will Prabowo respond ?
Will the elite back down ? They did in 1998. Then, the rioting forced the New Order elite to purge themselves of their more toxic members (such as Soeharto and, for a while, his then son-in-law, Prabowo) and reconfigure as nominal Reformasi democrats. But that does not look likely this time – at least not yet. Although Indonesia has been a constitutional democracy since 1999, real political authority is still firmly in the hands of a relatively small, entrenched, oligarchic elite.
They have learned to win elections and control the political process so effectively there is no meaningful political party opposition at all. This has created an increasingly undemocratic ruling coalition that has its own savage internal fights (such as those between Jokowi and Prabowo), but has proved extraordinarily resilient and resistant to external pressure.
While many rich and powerful oligarchs fear Prabowo’s innate authoritarianism, the current crisis is probably not enough to force a split with him.
Indeed, Prabowo may even be able to use his response to the riots to further consolidate his power. Some suggest he may even impose martial law if they continue.
And this means that once the current unrest dies down (and that may take a while), and Prabowo and his inner circle feel sufficiently in control again, a harsh crackdown on civil society critics and protest leaders is a very real possibility.
