• Contact
  • Connexion

Indonesia : No ‘magic bullet’


Protesters at the Thursday (Kamisan) protest outside the Presidential Palace in June 2014, warning against a Prabowo presidency - ©Vannessa Hearman

It has been a strange year for human rights under the Joko Widodo, or Jokowi, administration. Human rights activists were among those who invested a great deal of energy in Jokowi’s election campaign. They volunteered individually, as well as setting up campaign groups to prevent the election of his rival, former Army Special Forces (Kopassus) commander, Prabowo Subianto. Unlike previous presidents, Jokowi is not part of the military or civilian power elite.

Successive presidents from Habibie to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) have proven unable to address human rights abuses dating back to the Suharto regime. These abuses include the 1965–66 mass violence against members and sympathisers of the Indonesian Communist Party, the disappearance of political activists in 1997–98 and human rights abuses in West Papua, Aceh and East Timor.

It would be reasonable to expect that Jokowi’s administration would be better able to address these abuses, as he has no direct connection to any of these events. But the last year has revealed that Jokowi is not the ‘magic bullet’ for resolving human rights abuses in Indonesia. Instead, he has cultivated strong links with former and current military figures and has maintained the status quo with regards to the 1965 violence and human rights issues in Papua.
Optimism in the face of ambiguity

Activists welcomed Jokowi’s campaign pledge of Nawa Cita, nine points which included a commitment to upholding the rule of law and implementing clean government. Jokowi’s action program, unveiled during the campaign, pledged respect for human rights and to deliver justice for past human rights abuses. Those activists who threw their support behind Jokowi relied on these specific promises, as well as the fact that the alternative, Prabowo Subianto, was too unsavoury to contemplate.

The loyalty of activists was nevertheless divided during the presidential campaign. Jokowi supporters saw Prabowo as unpalatable. It was under his leadership that Kopassus was implicated in the 1997–98 disappearance of activists. Some of these activists developed techniques to try to influence the vote. For example, the Coalition Against Forgetting, which involved 25 human rights and civil society groups, urged voters not to support candidates with a problematic human rights record. Activists opposed to Jokowi pointed out on social media such as Twitter that his campaign involved generals with problematic pasts including the former head of the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), AM Hendropriyono, who was implicated in human rights activist Munir’s murder in 2004.
A year of no gains

In office, Jokowi has shown himself to be a politically weak president. He does not enjoy clear support in parliament. Even within his own party, he does not hold a strong position. In particular, he is bound to satisfying the interests of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the party leader, who is close to certain military officers.

Since becoming president, Jokowi has made appointments aimed to keep the military on side. These appointments have attracted criticism. For example, he appointed former military officers Ryamizard Ryacudu as defence minister and Sutiyoso as head of the National Intelligence Agency. Ryacudu has expressed some hardline anti-separatist sentiments and is the first defence minister to have come from a military background since 2001. Sutiyoso is under a cloud for his role as the Jakarta military commander in 1996 during the violent invasion of the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) headquarters in the 27 July incident . His coordinating minister for legal, political and security affairs is Luhut Panjaitan, a former Kopassus officer.

In many ways the Jokowi era has not represented a definitive break from the previous SBY presidency in terms of human rights. One example is the delivery of an apology to human rights abuse victims. In 2012, SBY promised to deliver such an apology but failed to do so. Similarly, the Jokowi administration in October 2015 rejected rumours that the president intended to deliver an apology to the 1965–66 abuse victims. The Jokowi adminstration’s approach to other human rights issues shows similar ties with the past.
Special challenges : anti-communist violence and Papua

Two of the most sensitive human rights issues in Indonesia are the 1965–66 violence and Papua. The 1965¬–66 violence involves powerful perpetrators such as the military and members of the religious organization, Nahdlatul Ulama. Papuans continue to suffer human rights abuses, despite the introduction of regional autonomy after the fall of Suharto. These cases, while difficult, are important to resolve if Indonesia is to make a break with the past.

Jokowi’s position on the 1965–66 violence is contradictory. While he has promised to provide an apology to victims, he led the ceremony at the Lubang Buaya monument to the seven slain army officers on ‘Sacred Pancasila Day’ on 1 October last year, just as his predecessors had. The monument is premised on the New Order regime’s misrepresentation of history. It does not mention the half a million people slaughtered as part of the anti-communist pogroms in 1965–66. To conduct an official ceremony on 1 October without commenting on the lies upon which it was founded simply reinforces that New Order’s version of history at a time when Indonesia desperately needs a national consensus on the 1965 events rather than the usual moral panic about the reawakening of communism.

The question of Papua also highlights Jokowi’s quandary. He is aware of the serious problems that exist in Papua and shows a level of sympathy with indigenous Papuans. Jokowi has visited Papua more than once, including during the election campaign, and has pledged to stop transmigration to Papua. In May 2015, he released five Papuan political prisoners under an amnesty program and has declared Papua open for international journalists to cover news there. He has, however, stopped short of discussing the drawdown of troops from the two provinces. Human Rights Watch in a report released in November 2015 has shown that, in reality, foreign journalists continue to have difficulties accessing Papua. In effect, Jokowi is caught in a bind as he cannot be seen to be giving too much green light to those questioning Indonesia’s repressive Papua policies.
A disappointing start

Jokowi in office has proven to be a disappointment when it comes to human rights. For a start, he has not involved activist and survivor groups or NGOs in his efforts to deal with past human rights abuses, even though he embraced them prior to his election While some well-known former activists are part of his administration, such as his chief of staff, Teten Masduki, at the same time more former military officers have joined the cabinet.

To break with the past, Jokowi has to confront two of the most sensitive issues in Indonesian history – the anti-communist killings of 1965–66 and decades of violence in Papua. He has shown on both fronts to be reluctant to break new ground. Without sufficient pressure from below and internationally, Jokowi’s reign does not promise any great achievements for human rights for which he will be remembered.


Les opinions exprimées et les arguments avancés dans cet article demeurent l'entière responsabilité de l'auteur-e et ne reflètent pas nécessairement ceux du CETRI.

Lire aussi ...

Inde : quand la jeunesse ébranle le pouvoir

2 septembre 2026

En quelques semaines, la jeunesse indienne a réussi à ébranler le pouvoir de Narendra Modi. Une mobilisation qui, en dépassant les clivages habituels, ouvre une brèche dans un système qui semblait verrouillé. Reste à voir si cet élan se transformera en force politique durable. Qui l’aurait cru (…)

Nicaragua : l’ultime raidissement du régime ?

1er septembre 2026

Dans cette « carte blanche » publiée par Le Soir, Bernard Duterme (CETRI), auteur de Toujours sandiniste, le Nicaragua ? (Bruxelles, Couleur Livres) et de Amérique latine : les nouveaux conflits (Paris, Syllepse), tente de décrypter le nouveau verrouillage dictatorial du régime de Daniel Ortega (…)

Niger : des mutins défient le régime qui annonce « reprendre le contrôle »

31 août 2026

Des échanges de tirs ont éclaté à Niamey, la capitale du Niger, entre soldats insurgés et forces loyales au général Abdourahamane Tiani. Dans cet entretien sur TV5 Monde Info-, François Polet, chargé d’études au CETRI, commente la situation et la tournée au Sahel de Maxime Prévot, ministre (…)

Le message des cafards de l’Inde à la gauche

31 août 2026

Dans l’après-midi du 25 juillet 2026, Dharmendra Pradhan [ministre de l’Éducation depuis juillet 2021, NDT] a publié sa lettre de démission sur X. Quelques heures plus tard, après un troisième cycle de négociations avec les ministres de l’Union J. P. Nadda et Jitendra Singh, les porte-parole du (…)

En plein virage latino vers l’extrême droite, le Brésil hésite entre Lula et Flavio Bolsonaro

27 août 2026

Dans deux mois, les Brésiliens éliront leur prochain président, et le fils de Jair Bolsonaro est en bonne position face à Lula. Le Brésil rejoindra-t-il les autres nations latinos qui, du Chili à la Colombie, du Pérou à l’Argentine, sont passées dans le camp de l’ultradroite ? Un article de (…)

Comment les États-Unis apposent une « logique transactionnelle » à l’aide sanitaire en Afrique

25 août 2026

Des accords bilatéraux avec une vingtaine de pays africains ont déjà été signés, renforçant l’influence américaine dans la région. Un article de Nathan Scheirlinckx (La Libre Belgique) provenant d’un entretien avec Aurélie Leroy (CETRI). Depuis que Donald Trump est revenu à la Maison-Blanche, (…)

Why Chinese Analysts Are Linking Morocco’s Gaza Role to Spain’s Ceuta Crisis

24 août 2026

At first glance, Morocco’s participation in the proposed international stabilization force in Gaza and the extraordinary migration crisis in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta appear to be two separate stories. At first glance, Morocco’s participation in the proposed international stabilization (…)

L’Afrique dans la compétition des puissances : de la rivalité géopolitique à l’autonomie stratégique

24 août 2026

Depuis le début des années 2000, l’affirmation de puissances telles que la Chine, l’Inde ou la Russie a contribué à l’émergence d’un ordre international de plus en plus multipolaire, marqué par une remise en cause de la prééminence occidentale. Dans ce contexte de reconfiguration géopolitique, (…)

Un nouveau cycle de soulèvements populaires ?

13 août 2026

L’éditorial de l’ouvrage collectif « Gen Z. Nouveau cycle des soulèvements populaires ? » Entre discrédit des classes dirigeantes, inégalités croissantes et horizons sociaux bloqués, une nouvelle vague de révoltes traverse le Sud. Sous l’étiquette Gen Z, elle exprime moins une identité (…)

Sri Lanka : un nouveau contrat social ?

13 août 2026

La crise de 2022 a donné naissance à l’Aragalaya, la plus importante mobilisation populaire de l’histoire récente du pays. En contestant les politiques économiques et la légitimité des élites dirigeantes, le mouvement a fait émerger l’idée d’un nouveau contrat social. Sans être révolutionnaire, (…)

Sri Lanka : l’Aragalaya au prisme du féminisme de gauche

13 août 2026

L’Aragalaya (« la lutte ») de 2022 au Sri Lanka n’a pas seulement contesté le pouvoir de la famille Rajapaksa. Le mouvement a aussi ouvert un espace inédit aux luttes féministes. Des ouvrières des zones franches aux victimes du microcrédit, des militantes articulent désormais critique de (…)

Bangladesh : l’exclusion post-soulèvement des femmes

13 août 2026

De la rue aux urnes, les femmes bangladaises ont disparu. Actrices centrales du soulèvement de 2024, elles sont marginalisées dans la transition. Ce paradoxe s’explique moins par un échec de mobilisation que par un « cycle de réversion » : après la crise, les réseaux de pouvoir patriarcaux et (…)